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donations to those types of charities. They may not
be, but that’s a different question from talking about
harm to the sector in general or harm to the poor
from those proposals.
More ambitiously, we should grant larger tax
benefits to contributions to organizations that pro-
vide basic needs to the poor. You want to help
education? Let’s provide more incentives for dona-
tions to a tutoring program in a low-income area
than we do for donations to your kid’s school
(which you would probably do anyway). To that
end, I propose that donations to organizations that
provide basic services to the poor be treated more
generously for tax purposes than other donations.
Let’s say that you donate $100 to a soup kitchen. If
the deduction remains a deduction, perhaps you are
treated as if you had donated $200 (thus triggering
a government subsidy of $80 instead of $40). If an
AGI floor is implemented, perhaps those contribu-
tions are not subject to the floor. If the deduction is
changed to a credit of, say, 15 percent, maybe you
would receive a 30 percent credit for those types of
donations.
By emphasizing donations to organizations help-
ing the neediest, we’d be putting our money where
our mouths are when it comes to charitable giving.
We routinely use charity for the poor not only as a
justification for continuing the tax status quo but
also to excuse less government aid to the poor. For
example, the bipartisan letter to Baucus argued that
if the deduction were reformed, ‘‘the government
would be required to step in and fund those ser-
vices now being provided through private generos-
ity. Accordingly, preserving the charitable
deduction is also prudent as a matter of broad fiscal
policy.’’12 There are very valid reasons for wanting
charity to do more, and government less, when
helping the poor. Quite often, charities can find
more efficient, more responsive, and more creative
ways of assisting the poor than the government can.
So let’s structure the tax incentives for charitable
giving to reflect these values. Perhaps it’s an area in
which Republicans and Democrats can find com-
mon ground.
Revitalizing the Estate
Tax: 5 Easy Pieces
By Paul L. Caron and James R. Repetti
Introduction
In a previous article,1 we argued that contrary to
the state of the law over 35 years ago — when
George Cooper wrote his seminal article on the
estate tax2 — taxpayers today generally ‘‘can reduce
the value of assets subject to transfer tax in many
instances only if they are willing to assume the risk
that the reduction may be economically real and
reduce the actual value of assets transferred to heirs
or, alternatively, in narrow situations if they are
willing to incur some tax risk.’’3 We showed that the
estate tax helps reduce wealth concentration when
12See supra note 5.
1Paul L. Caron and James R. Repetti, ‘‘The Estate Tax
Non-Gap, Why Repeal a Voluntary Tax?’’ 20 Stan. L. & Pol’y Rev.
153 (2009).
2George Cooper, ‘‘A Voluntary Tax? New Perspectives on
Sophisticated Estate Tax Avoidance,’’ 77 Colum. L. Rev. 161
(1977).
3See Caron and Repetti, supra note 1, at 162.
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one accounts for the amount of charitable contribu-
tions made and taxes paid by the estate. In 2006, for
example, the largest estates (those with gross values
exceeding $20 million) on average paid taxes equal
to 15.57 percent and made charitable contributions
of 17.83 percent of their gross value. In other words,
one-third of the assets of the largest estates were
transferred outside the family. We also showed that
there are strong arguments that the estate tax gap is
much lower (10 to 13 percent) than is commonly
assumed because of the personal liability that can
be imposed on the executor and the historically
high audit rate for estates. We concluded that only
when we have an accurate view of the role that the
estate tax currently plays can we make sensible
decisions in charting its future.4
In another article,5 we documented the dramatic
increase in income and wealth inequality over the
past 30 years and the accompanying adverse social
consequences and long-term negative effect on eco-
nomic growth. We argued that tax policy histori-
cally has played an important role in reducing
inequality and that the estate tax is a particularly
apt reform vehicle in light of the role of inherited
assets among the very rich and the adverse eco-
nomic effects of that inherited wealth. We updated
our earlier work showing that the estate tax plays a
significant role in breaking up concentrations of
wealth, with fewer adverse effects on taxpayer
behavior than the income tax.
In this article, we advance five estate and gift tax
reform proposals that would generate needed rev-
enue, reduce inequality, and contribute to economic
growth: (1) disallow minority discounts when the
transferred asset or business is controlled by family
before and after the transfer; (2) maintain parity
between the unified credit exemption amounts for
the estate and gift taxes; (3) reduce the wealth
transfer tax exemptions to $3.5 million, increase the
maximum tax rate to 45 percent, and limit the
generation-skipping transfer tax (GSST) exemption
period to 50 years; (4) restrict the ability for gifts
made in trust to qualify for the gift tax annual
exclusion; and (5) impose a lifetime cap on the
amount that can be contributed to a grantor re-
tained annuity trust (GRAT).
These five estate tax reform proposals are for the
most part not new. Most have been advanced in
various forms in the past by the American Bar
Association, the American College of Trust and
Estate Counsel, and commentators, and many have
been embraced by President Obama in prior budget
proposals. We offer our thoughts on the proposals
here in the hope that they will help promote these
much-needed reforms.
Proposal 1: Disallow minority discounts when
the transferred entity or asset is controlled before
and after the transfer by the transferor, or the
transferor’s spouse, ancestors, or lineal descen-
dants. Minority discounts have troubled policy-
makers and academics for decades.6 Planning with
minority discounts usually involves using a series
of transfers to divide up a taxpayer’s control of an
asset, such as a business or real estate, in order to
reduce the asset’s value for purposes of the wealth
transfer taxes. Division of control reduces the as-
set’s value because it impairs the transferees’ ability
to direct the use of the asset for more profitable
pursuits. For a business, loss of control also in-
creases the intrinsic risk associated with the busi-
ness and reduces the opportunities to engage in
favorable transactions, such as employment, with
it.7 As a result, eliminating control regarding por-
tions of a business transferred by the taxpayer can
result in significant discounts below what the value
would have been if control had been included.8
4Id. at 169.
5Caron and Repetti, ‘‘Occupy the Tax Code: Using the Estate
Tax to Reduce Inequality and Spur Economic Growth,’’ 40 Pepp.
L. Rev. 1255 (2013).
6For early discussions of this issue, see Alan Feld, ‘‘The
Implications of Minority Interest and Stock Restrictions in
Valuing Closely-Held Shares,’’ 122 U. Pa. L. Rev. 934, 945-946
(1974); Mary L. Fellows and William H. Painter, ‘‘Valuing Close
Corporations for Federal Wealth Transfer Taxes: A Statutory
Solution of the Disappearing Wealth Syndrome,’’ 30 Stan. L. Rev.
895, 924-925 (1978); Joseph M. Dodge, ‘‘Redoing the Estate and
Gift Taxes Along Easy-to-Value Lines,’’ 43 Tax L. Rev. 241,
254-256 (1988); Repetti, ‘‘Minority Discounts: The Alchemy in
Estate and Gift Taxation,’’ 50 Tax L. Rev. 415 (1995); William S.
Blatt, ‘‘Minority Discounts, Fair Market Value, and the Culture
of Estate Taxation,’’ 52 Tax L. Rev. 225 (1997); Laura E. Cunning-
ham, ‘‘Remember the Alamo: The IRS Needs Ammunition in Its
Fight Against the FLP,’’ Tax Notes, Mar. 13, 2000, p. 1461; Walter
D. Schwidetzky, ‘‘Last-Gasp Estate Planning: The Formation of
Family Limited Liability Entities Shortly Before Death,’’ 21 Va.
Tax Rev. 1, 249-250 (2001); Ronald H. Jensen, ‘‘The Magic of
Disappearing Wealth Revisited: Using Family Limited Partner-
ships to Reduce Estate and Gift Tax,’’ 1 Pitt. Tax Rev. 155 (2004);
David M. Guess, ‘‘Disregarding the Mona Lisa’s Disappearing
Mustache: An Analysis Into the Increased Judicial Scrutiny of
the Tax Treatment of Family Limited Partnership Interests,’’ 32
W. St. U. L. Rev. 177, 194-195 (2005); Mitchell M. Gans and Jay A.
Soled, ‘‘Reforming the Gift Tax and Making It Enforceable,’’ 87
B.U. L. Rev. 759, 785-787 (2007); Wendy C. Gerzog, ‘‘Not All
Defined Value Clauses Are Equal,’’ 10 Pitt. Tax Rev. 44 (2012);
John F. Coverdale, ‘‘Of Red Bags and Family Limited Partner-
ships: Reforming the Estate and Gift Tax Valuation Rules to
Achieve Horizontal Equity,’’ 51 U. Louisville L. Rev. 239, 263
(2013); Treasury, ‘‘Tax Reform for Fairness, Simplicity, and
Economic Growth,’’ vol. 2, 386-387 (1984); and H.R. Rep. No.
100-495, at 995 (1987).
7See Fellows and Painter, supra note 6, at 903-904; and
Repetti, supra note 6, at 425-426.
8It is difficult to quantify the amounts of the minority
discounts involved. Ted D. Englebrecht, Mary M. Anderson,
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The difficult issue regarding minority discounts,
however, is that in most instances, the control
premium has probably not been destroyed. Rather,
through careful selection of the transferees, the
taxpayer can create a situation in which the trans-
ferees will be able to reestablish control. That is,
transferees can work together to restore the value
that ‘‘disappeared’’ when ownership was divided.
As discussed below, it would not make economic
sense to destroy the control premium because every
dollar of premium destroyed saves only 40 cents in
taxes.
The process for eliminating the control premium
in gifts and bequests can occur in many contexts,
but it usually entails one of the two following
scenarios, or a blend thereof, involving a series of
transfers of minority interests to: (1) the same
individual over a period of years; or (2) several
different individuals in the same year or over a
period of years. For example, in scenario 1, the
taxpayer may make a series of transfers of minority
blocks of stock in her controlled corporation to her
child over a period of years so that her child will
have obtained control of the corporation after all the
transfers. Because our transfer tax system ignores
the identities of the transferee and transferor, each
transfer is valued separately, with the result that the
taxpayer’s transfer tax base will not include the
control premium that she in effect transferred over
a period of years. Similarly, in scenario 2, the
taxpayer might make a gift of minority blocks of
stock in her controlled corporation to several differ-
ent individuals in the same year or over a period of
years.9 Again, each gift would be valued apart from
the others, with the result that the gifts would not
include the control premium that had been divided
up among the transferees. A variation of scenarios 1
and 2 might involve transferring a valuable asset to
a limited liability company or family limited part-
nership and then making transfers (gifts and be-
quests) of minority member interests in the LLC or
FLP to the same transferee over a period of years, or
making gifts to several different individuals in the
same year.
It is easy to see that the control premium has
been transferred in scenario 1 because a single
individual ends up controlling the asset. There has
also been a transfer in scenario 2 but of a different
type. Scenario 2 represents the transformation of a
portion of the value formerly associated with con-
trol into an option or opportunity for the donees to
re-create that value.10 To do so, however, they must
agree about managing the transferred entity or
asset. Game theory suggests that if the minority
owners are members of a family, they have a higher
probability of reaching such an agreement than
non-family members:
Family members have an advantage in form-
ing coalitions because group members are
more likely to make credible promises when
they have a history of dealing with one an-
other and are likely to continue to do so in the
future. Repeated contact allows the creation of
credible commitments because non-exploiters
are able to retaliate in the future against a
person who breaks the commitment. Some
commentators also have asserted that homo-
geneity in preferences is another factor likely
to result in a stable coalition. Because of shared
experiences, family members probably are
more likely to have similar preferences.11
Similarly, John F. Coverdale recently explained:
In most cases, family members do not behave
like unrelated third parties. . . . A student of
marriage and family has suggested four rea-
sons for this: first, the threat of expulsion from
the family network or of lessened esteem
and Otto Martinson found that the mean discounts allowed by
the Tax Court during the 1993-2002 period were 25.35 percent
for marketability and 14.82 percent for lack of control discounts.
Englebrecht et al., ‘‘An Empirical Investigation of the Minority
Interest and Marketability Discounts in Valuation of Closely
Held Stock for Estate and Gift Tax Purposes,’’ 22 J. Applied Bus.
Res. 89, 99 (2006). Although in theory the marketability discount
should be unaffected by the size of the minority interest, some
courts have stated that the amount of control affects the
marketability discount and have allowed larger discounts for
smaller minority interests. See John A. Bogdanski, Federal Tax
Valuation, para. 4.04 (2013). This makes it difficult to quantify the
size of an aggregate discount attributable to a taxpayer being a
minority stakeholder. In an examination of 1998 returns, Barry
Johnson, Jacob Mikow, and Martha Britton Eller found that on
average, combined marketability and minority discounts of 29.8
percent were claimed for minority interests in stock and 36.3
percent for limited partner interests. Johnson et al., ‘‘Elements of
Federal Estate Taxation,’’ William G. Gale et al. eds., Rethinking
Estate and Gift Taxation 113 (2001). Some have argued that an
examination of premiums paid in acquisitions in which control
was acquired implies a minority discount of 30 percent for large
corporations. American Business Appraisers LLP, ‘‘Why Do We
Take a Minority Discount?’’ available at http://www.abasf.com/
articles/minority_discount.html. For an analysis of the factors
that should affect the determination of minority discounts, see
Aswath Damodaran, ‘‘The Value of Control: Implications for
Control Premiums, Minority Discounts and Voting Shares Dif-
ferentials,’’ 8 N.Y.U. J. L. & Bus. 487 (2012).
9Scenario 2 involves making gifts to several individuals,
rather than a bequest, because a minority discount is unavail-
able if the taxpayer’s gross estate holds a controlling interest,
even though the taxpayer may be bequeathing portions of the
asset to several individuals. This dichotomy between the estate
and gift taxes is discussed in greater detail in Repetti, supra note
6, at 419-422.
10Repetti, id., at 417.
11Id. at 465-466 (citations omitted).
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within that network deters non-cooperation;
second, information about other family mem-
bers reduces transaction costs; third, back-
ground social norms favor family cooperation;
and fourth, humans have evolved to behave
altruistically toward family.12
Given the continuing relationship among family
members, a taxpayer can construct transfers so that
control will not be destroyed. Indeed, there is no
economic incentive to destroy value.13 Every dollar
of control premium that is destroyed saves only 40
cents in taxes. Consider, for example, a parent who
transfers a family business to two children, giving
each child an equal right to control the business.
The sum of the values of the children’s interests in
the business under current valuation methods is
less than the value that the business had when
owned entirely by the parent. This reduction in
value reflects that neither child can implement her
plans for the business unilaterally. If one child
wishes to sell the business, but the other does not,
the former will be unable to maximize profit from
the sale because a third-party buyer will have to
negotiate control with the latter. If the value of the
business is discounted by $100, the donor saves $40
in gift tax because the tax applies to the value of the
property transferred to each donee. If this diminu-
tion in value is irreparable, the children have lost
$100, with the result that the family’s wealth has
decreased by a net of $60 ($100 reduction in value
less $40 in tax savings). Suppose, however, that the
children can restore $100 of value by incurring $10
of after-tax transaction costs to negotiate an agree-
ment to sell the business to a third party together. If
they do so, they will enjoy a net increase in value
while the donor will have saved $40 in taxes. As
long as the children can incur less than $40 of costs
to restore value, there will be a net savings to the
family as a whole.14
Presumably, if a parent divides up control, he
expects that the children will reach an agreement. If
dividing up control were to destroy the control
premium, the parent would have better alterna-
tives. He could maximize after-tax wealth for his
children by selling the business as a whole and
making gifts of the cash proceeds more than three
years before his death. Alternatively, if the business
has a low income tax basis, he could hold the
business until death and direct the estate to sell it as
a whole after his death in order to take advantage of
the step-up in basis.
There have been several thoughtful proposals to
eliminate minority discounts. Many have focused
on the use of entities such as LLCs and FLPs to
achieve minority discounts and have sought to set
liquidation value as the floor for valuation. For
example, Wendy C. Gerzog has suggested that the
discount involving LLCs or FLPs be disregarded if
the entity does not engage in a trade or business,
and that the entity’s assets should be valued at their
net value without minority discounts.15 William S.
Blatt has recommended that a business entity trans-
ferred to family members not be given a value
lower than its liquidation value.16 In a different
approach, Walter D. Schwidetzky has recom-
mended that section 2035 be amended to include in
a taxpayer’s gross estate the taxpayer’s transfers of
assets to FLPs and transfers of FLPs to family
members within three years of death.17
We disagree with these approaches because they
would still permit low valuations in many situa-
tions. Gerzog’s approach would still allow minority
discounts for family-controlled businesses. Blatt’s
liquidation value approach would permit active
businesses to be valued at less than their likely
going concern value because liquidation values are
often less than going concern values. Schwidetzky’s
approach would apply only to transfers made
within three years of death.
Another approach is to deny a minority discount
if the transferor controlled the entity before the
transfer — either outright or as the result of attri-
bution. Alan Feld has proposed a rebuttable pre-
sumption that the control premium is included in
the transfer of a minority interest by a taxpayer who
controls the entity.18 Ronald H. Jensen has recom-
mended that minority discounts be ‘‘disallowed if
the taxpayer’s primary purpose for using the entity
to make his gratuitous transfers is to qualify the
transfers for a valuation discount.’’19
The difficulty with these thoughtful suggestions
is that they are administratively burdensome.20
Feld’s approach would compel the courts, the IRS,
and taxpayers to explore the transferee’s relation-
ship to the other owners and the relationship
among the other owners in order to determine
12Coverdale, supra note 6, at 258-259 (citations omitted).
13Dodge, supra note 6, at 254, n.54 (‘‘of course, in many of
these cases, the economic loss attributable to the creation of
minority interests is probably illusory, or else the transaction
would not have been undertaken in the first place’’).
14For a more detailed exploration of this phenomenon, see
Repetti, supra note 6, at 417-418.
15Gerzog, supra note 6.
16Blatt, supra note 6, at 263-264.
17Schwidetzky, supra note 6, at 38-41.
18Feld, supra note 6, at 945. The taxpayer could rebut the
presumption by showing that the transferee will not be included
in the control group. Id.
19Jensen, supra note 6, at 203-204.
20Repetti, supra note 6, at 474, 481-482.
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whether the presumption that the transferee would
participate in control can be rebutted. Under
Jensen’s suggestion, the courts would have to un-
dertake a similar inquiry to discern the taxpayer’s
purpose for the transfers. Because the courts do not
examine the relationship of the transferee to the
other owners, this determination would increase
the quantity of analysis required for both the estate
tax and gift tax.21
Mary L. Fellows and William H. Painter have
proposed that ‘‘any gratuitous transfer of shares
from a donor who originally owned a controlling
interest in a corporation shall be valued as if they
were part of the controlling block.’’22 This proposal
would deny a minority discount if the taxpayer
held control, regardless of who the transferees are.23
While this approach would not require the types of
inquiries that the rebuttable presumption and pur-
pose approaches discussed above would, we think
that the approach is too broad because it would
apply in situations in which it is unlikely that
control has been transferred — for example, when a
controlling shareholder makes transfers to non-
family members.
Lastly, one of us previously proposed that a
minority discount should be denied when the trans-
feror and his family members control the entity
both before and after the transfer.24 This proposal is
similar to the approach adopted earlier by the IRS in
Rev. Rul. 81-253, 1981-2 C.B. 187,25 and to a 1987
proposal by the House Budget Committee.26 The
advantage of this approach is that it applies to
situations in which it is most likely that control has
been transferred because the transferees are family
members. Also, this approach is not as administra-
tively burdensome as the rebuttable presumption or
purpose approach because the transferor’s intent
and the degree of hostility among the transferees
would be irrelevant.27
We believe that control is most likely transferred
when the transferor, her spouse, their ancestors, or
their lineal descendants control the entity both
before and after the transfer. This is the same sort of
attribution rule that Congress adopted in section
2701(a) for distribution rights.28 Section 2701 in
effect creates an irrebuttable presumption that fam-
ily members in a controlled entity will work to-
gether to enhance the value of gifts of common
stock in an estate freeze by not paying dividends on
preferred stock retained by the transferor.29 This
approach should be extended to minority discounts
because the same motivation for family members
who are closely related to each other to work
together exists in the context of minority discounts
as in estate freezes. We reject the argument that this
approach is inappropriate because it would not
distinguish situations in which the transfer of con-
trol was unlikely, for example, because of hostility
among owners. For reasons discussed earlier, it is
very unlikely that a transferor would destroy value
by dividing up control of an asset among family
members who cannot work together. As a result, the
instances in which the irrebuttable presumption
would be overinclusive are few.
Proposal 2: Maintain parity between the uni-
fied credit exemption amounts for the estate and
gift taxes. Obama’s wealth transfer tax proposals
include reducing the unified credit exemption
equivalent amount to $3.5 million for estates and $1
million for gifts, and increasing the maximum tax
rate to 45 percent.30 The proposals also limit the
GSTT exemption to generation-skipping transfers
(GSTs) that occur within 90 years of the initial
transfer to which the exemption was allocated. As
discussed below, we agree with some of these
recommendations and propose changes for others.
In this section, we explain why we believe it is
important that the unified credit amount be the
same for both the estate tax and gift tax. In the next
section, we address the desirability of reducing the
exemption amounts to $3.5 million, increasing the
maximum rate to 45 percent, and limiting the
period for which the GSTT exemption may be used.
21Id.
22Fellows and Painter, supra note 6, at 923. Dodge also has
endorsed this approach. Dodge, supra note 6, at 255-256.
23Treasury adopted this approach. Treasury, supra note 6, at
386-387.
24Repetti, supra note 6, at 481.
25Revoked by Rev. Rul. 93-12, 1993-1 C.B. 202.
26H.R. Rep. No. 100-391, at 1043 (1987). The House Budget
Committee proposed language stating that the value of stock is
‘‘deemed to be equal to its pro rata share of all the stock of the
same class in such corporation, unless a different value is
established by clear and convincing evidence’’ (emphasis added).
The committee report explained:
In determining whether a different value can be estab-
lished under the clear and convincing evidence standard,
all stock held, directly or indirectly, by an individual or by
members of such individual’s family is treated as held by
one person. Thus, a minority discount will not be appropriate
for transfers between family members unless all the stock held
by that person or the person’s family would qualify for the
discount. [Emphasis added.]
Id.
27Repetti, supra note 6, at 474, 481-482.
28These are rights to distributions from a corporation regard-
ing its stock or from a partnership regarding a partnership
interest. Section 2701(c)(1).
29See Repetti, supra note 6, at 437-438.
30Treasury, ‘‘General Explanations of the Administration’s
Fiscal Year 2014 Revenue Proposals,’’ at 138 (Apr. 2013) (green
book).
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We disagree with the president’s proposal that
the unified credit exclusion for the gift tax ($1
million) should be lower than the exclusion for the
estate tax ($3.5 million). A little background may be
helpful to understand our concern. The federal
estate and gift tax exclusion amounts had been
identical for almost 25 years before the Economic
Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001
(EGTRRA).31 In EGTRRA, Congress caused the es-
tate tax exclusion to exceed the gift tax exclusion
beginning in 2004. In 2010 the exclusion amounts
were once again the same under the Tax Relief,
Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization, and Job
Creation Act of 2010.
The justification for the different credit levels in
EGTRRA was that a less generous exclusion amount
for gifts was needed to protect the income tax
base.32 But as the ABA noted, this justification ‘‘was
never supported beyond mere speculation.’’33 At
the same time, the less favorable treatment of gifts
potentially created several problems. The ABA ob-
served:
No sound reason exists to severely penalize
individuals who wish to give away assets
during life. Anecdotal evidence from practice
indicates that the considerably less generous
credit under the gift tax prevented parents
from making lifetime transfers to children as a
result of the effective tax penalty on the value
of cumulative transfers falling between the
two credit levels. Rather than imposing a
penalty on gratuitous transfers made during
life, we believe that, from the public policy
perspectives of encouraging generosity among
family members and promoting the free trans-
ferability of capital, lifetime transfers are to be
encouraged. As a practical matter, lifetime
gifts shift property to individuals who are
more likely to put the property to productive
economic use. The re-unification of the gift
and estate tax unified credits achieved by the
2010 legislation therefore represents a salutary
return to a significant and important prior
policy.34
Perhaps because of the potential social benefits
arising from gifts versus bequests,35 the code has
historically contained provisions that encourage
gifts over bequests.36 The gift tax is tax exclusive,
while the estate tax is tax inclusive, with the result
that the tax liability associated with gifts is lower
than for bequests. Moreover, the annual exclusion
enables donors to transfer significant amounts as
gifts tax free.37 It would be counterproductive to
retain these provisions and then adopt a credit
exclusion for gifts that is lower than the credit for
estates, and that would have the effect of discour-
aging gifts. Consequently, we recommend that the
exclusion amounts for the gift tax and estate tax be
the same.
Proposal 3: Return to the $3.5 million exemp-
tion, increase the maximum rate to 45 percent, and
limit the GSTT exemption to transfers occurring
within 50 years. As mentioned above, we agree
31ABA sections of Taxation and Real Property, Trust and
Estate Law, ‘‘Options for Tax Reform and Simplification With
Respect to Federal Estate, Gift and GST Taxes,’’ at 6 (Apr. 4,
2012).
32Id.
33Id.
34Id. at 6-7.
35It has been argued that wealthy individuals are more risk
averse than less wealthy individuals. See, e.g., Paul L. Menchik
and Martin David, ‘‘Income Distribution, Lifetime Savings, and
Bequests,’’ 73 Am. Econ. Rev. 672 (1983). As a result, a normative
basis exists for encouraging inter vivos gifts. See, e.g., Paul B.
Stephan III, ‘‘A Comment on Transfer Tax Reform,’’ 72 Va. L.
Rev. 1471, 1487-1488 (1986):
It seems reasonable to believe that the rich — that is to
say, people who have sufficient disposable wealth to be
concerned about the transfer taxes — are relatively risk-
averse when it comes to their excess capital. This assump-
tion may seem counter-intuitive at first, because one
might expect the average person to take the greatest
chances with money that he does not need. But risk-
taking is for most mortals the necessary counterpart of
higher rates of return, and it is the rich who presumably
are least concerned with the growth of their disposable
wealth. We may expect the rich to take fewer risks simply
because they are least dissatisfied with the rate of return
on low-risk investments.
If this intuition about the wealthy is correct, it should
follow that the dispersion of their wealth through gratu-
itous transfers will place capital in the hands of people
more willing to take chances. In the case of closely held
businesses, for example, we associate an intergenera-
tional turnover of management with innovation and
provide some income tax incentives to speed up the
changing of the guard. Seen in this light, the transfer tax
preference for inter vivos gifts may have welfare benefits,
as it can nudge wealth out of the hands of aging owners
and into the possession of younger, more productive
entrepreneurs. [Citations omitted.]
‘‘Hearings on Tax Reform Before the House Comm. on Ways
and Means,’’ 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 3992 (1969) (testimony of
George Craven); Id. at 4005 (testimony of Robert F. Spindell).
36See, e.g., John G. Steinkamp, ‘‘Common Sense and the Gift
Tax Annual Exclusion,’’ 72 Neb. L. Rev. 106, 110-111 (1993)
(noting that the gift tax enacted in 1932 was tax exclusive and
had a rate schedule that was three-quarters of the estate tax
rates); and H.R. Rep. No. 94-1380, at 6, 12 (1976) (observing that
at the time of the 1976 tax reform, there were several incentives
for lifetime gifts in the gift tax and that the committee was
purposefully ‘‘retaining part of the incentives for life-time
transfers’’).
37One countervailing influence is that there is a carryover
income tax basis for gifts, while bequests receive a step-up in
basis. We believe that this may affect the assets that taxpayers
select for inter vivos gifts but that it does not significantly reduce
the amount of those gifts.
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with the president’s proposal to return the unified
credit exemption amount to $3.5 million. The very
generous $5 million unified credit exemption for
gifts and bequests and the $5 million GSTT exemp-
tion (both of which, adjusted for inflation, are $5.34
million in 2014) permit large amounts of money to
escape transfer taxation. This results in a significant
loss of revenue38 and contributes to the concentra-
tion of wealth.
To see how these exemptions interact to pass
along large concentrations of untaxed wealth, con-
sider that a taxpayer can transfer $5.34 million as
either a gift or a bequest to a dynasty trust (a trust
that is not subject to the rule against perpetuities)
that will make payments to the taxpayer’s descen-
dants without incurring any transfer tax. That is,
neither the transfer within the trust nor the trust’s
transfers to beneficiaries will ever be subject to the
GSTT, estate tax, or gift tax. Assuming a 6 percent39
rate of capital appreciation and that only trust
income (not capital) is distributed annually to ben-
eficiaries, the $5.34 million transferred into a dy-
nasty trust would grow to $98 million in 50 years,
$1.01 billion in 90 years, and $1.8 billion in 100
years. As discussed elsewhere, the concentration of
this type of wealth in families contributes to many
social harms and conflicts with the policy rationales
for imposing transfer taxes.40
When the GSTT was adopted in 1986, the exemp-
tion amount was only $1 million, and the rule
against perpetuities prevented the creation of dy-
nasty trusts in most states.41 In contrast, it is re-
ported that by early 2013, 29 states and the District
of Columbia had adopted provisions that permit
dynasty trusts.42 It is likely that the GSTT exemp-
tion has played a significant role in the drive for
states to permit dynasty trusts.43 In hearings that
preceded the enactment of the GSTT in 1986, Ray-
mond Young, the chair of the GST Tax Subcommit-
tee of the Boston Bar Association, testified before
Congress that the exemption would result in a
marketing blitz by banks and trust companies:
We are obliged to point out . . . that if [the 1986
GSTT exemption] is adopted . . . it will be an
inducement to generation skipping. You will
have more generation skipping than you ever
had under pre-1976 law, and there will be a
greater erosion of the tax base, because you
will have the banks, lawyers, financial plan-
ners, and all others saying, here you are, this is
a specially created opportunity for you. Con-
gress has said you can take $1 million, put it
aside, no generation-skipping tax.44
The purpose of the GST, estate, and gift taxes is to
impose a transfer tax on the passage of wealth from
one generation to the next. Yet the existence of
dynasty trusts, in combination with the generous
GST, estate, and gift tax exemptions, permits large
amounts of assets to be passed from one generation
to another without a transfer tax being incurred.
This was probably never contemplated by Congress
when the GSTT exemption was adopted, because
lawmakers would have reasonably believed that
the rule against perpetuities would prevent the
GSTT exemption from being applied forever.45 In-
deed, Congress has previously exhibited a dislike
for transfers that avoided the rule against perpetu-
ities in order to escape from transfer tax. In 1951
Congress adopted section 2041(a)(3) to prevent tax-
payers from creating successive powers of appoint-
ment that would avoid application of the rule
against perpetuities and, therefore, would not result
in a taxable transfer.46 The legislative history to
section 2041(a)(3) states:
38Revenue estimates in the Treasury green book stated that
revenues would increase by $71.693 billion during the 2019-2023
period if the estate and GSTT exemption amounts were reduced
to $3.5 million, the gift tax exemption was reduced to $1.5
million, and the maximum estate tax rate was increased to 45
percent in 2019. Green book, supra note 30, at 244.
39The growth rate, compounded annually, of the S&P 500
(not including dividends) from January 1, 1993 (when the index
was $435.71) to December 31, 2012 (when the index was
$1,426.19) was 6.109 percent per year.
40See, e.g., Repetti, ‘‘Democracy, Taxes and Wealth,’’ 76 N.Y.U.
L. Rev. 825 (2001).
41In 1986 only three states (Idaho, South Dakota, and Wis-
consin) had repealed the rule against perpetuities. See Robert H.
Sitkoff and Max M. Schanzenbach, ‘‘Jurisdictional Competition
for Trust Funds: An Empirical Analysis of Perpetuities and
Taxes,’’ 115 Yale L. J. 356, 373 (2005).
42Grayson M.P. McCouch, ‘‘Who Killed the Rule Against
Perpetuities?’’ 40 Pepp. L. Rev. 1291, 1292, n.3 (2013).
43See, e.g., Ray D. Madoff, Immortality and the Law 80-82
(2010); Ira Mark Bloom, ‘‘The GST Tax Tail Is Killing the Rule
Against Perpetuities,’’ Tax Notes, Apr. 24, 2000, p. 569; Schan-
zenbach and Sitkoff, ‘‘Perpetuities or Taxes? Explaining the Rise
of the Perpetual Trust,’’ 27 Cardozo L. Rev. 2465, 2477-2478 (2006);
Jesse Dukeminier and James E. Krier, ‘‘The Rise of the Perpetual
Trust,’’ 50 UCLA L. Rev. 1303 (2003).
44‘‘Generation-Skipping Transfer Tax: Hearings Before the H.
Comm. on Ways and Means,’’ 98th Cong. 335, 336 (1984)
(testimony of Raymond Young). See Schanzenbach and Sitkoff,
supra note 43, at 2477; and Madoff, supra note 43, at 80.
45See, e.g., Fellows, ‘‘Why the Generation-Skipping Transfer
Tax Sparked Perpetual Trusts,’’ 27 Cardozo L. Rev. 2511, 2518
(2006); Lawrence Waggoner, ‘‘From Here to Eternity: The Folly
of Perpetual Trusts,’’ U. Mich. Public Law Working Paper No.
259, at 2-3 (Apr. 2013).
46See, e.g., Jonathan G. Blattmachr and Jeffrey N. Pennell,
‘‘Adventures in Generation-Skipping, or How We Learned to
Love the ‘Delaware Tax Trap,’’’ 24 Real Prop., Prob. & Tr. J. 75,
84-86 (1989).
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In at least one State a succession of powers of
appointment, general or limited, may be cre-
ated and exercised over an indefinite period
without violating the rule against perpetuities.
In the absence of some special provision in the
statute, property could be handed down from
generation to generation without ever being
subject to estate tax.47
Given that the generous exclusion amounts for
the GST, estate, and gift taxes, combined with the
lack of a time limit for the GSTT exemption, conflict
with the policy rationale for those taxes, we recom-
mend two changes. First, we would reduce the GST,
estate, and gift tax exclusion amounts to $3.5 mil-
lion and limit the GSTT exemption to a specific
period.
There are several possible approaches for deter-
mining the limitation period. The president’s pro-
posal recommends that the GSTT exemption be
limited to 90 years.48 The administration presum-
ably proposes this period because it approximates
the period for the rule against perpetuities. We
think that a better approach is to limit the GSTT
exemption to a period that approximates the span
of two generations. This would mean that in the
most extreme situation — in which a transferor
makes a transfer in trust before he has any children
— the exemption would still be available to benefit
the transferor’s grandchildren. The current statu-
tory scheme for the GSTT assumes that the period
for two generations is 37.5 years.49 Data suggest,
however, that grandchildren are born, on average,
50 years after the birth of the grandparent.50 We
think that the estimated two-generation period
should reflect those data. Consequently, we recom-
mend that the exemption terminate 50 years after
the initial transfer in trust to which the exemption is
allocated.
We also agree with the president’s proposal to
increase the maximum rate to 45 percent. As we
recently discussed, the estate tax is an effective tool
for reducing wealth concentration.51 This is benefi-
cial because there is significant evidence that wealth
concentration is harmful to society.52 Yet as a result
of declining rates and increased exemptions, the
role of wealth transfer taxes in reducing wealth
concentration has decreased. The top marginal es-
tate tax rate in the United States was 70 percent or
above during most of the post-World War II period
through 1981.53 Beginning in 1981, rates began to
decrease. As a result of those decreases, the estate
tax collected was about 0.6 percent of GDP in the
1960s and only 0.25 percent of GDP in 2004, accord-
ing to calculations by Thomas Piketty and Em-
manuel Saez.54 They observe that the decline in the
amounts collected has contributed significantly to
the general decline of progressivity in the U.S. tax
system.55
The greatest potential harm from taxing gifts and
estates is that it may discourage saving.56 However,
there are strong arguments that the effect of the
estate and gift taxes may be less than that of the
income tax,57 and the empirical evidence to date
suggests a minimal effect on savings.58 Given the
relative economic efficiency of the estate tax versus
47H.R. Rep. No. 82-327, at 6-7 (1951); S. Rep. No. 82-382, at 6
(1951).
48See green book, supra note 30, at 143.
49Section 2651(d)(2).
50That is, 50 years after the birth of the grandmother. The
mean age of a mother in the United States at the time of her first
child’s birth is 25. OECD, ‘‘OECD Family Data Base, SF 2.3: Mean
Age of Mothers at First Childbirth,’’ available at http://www.o
ecd.org/social/soc/SF2.3%20Mean%20age%20of%20mother%2
0at%20first%20childbirth%20-%20updated%20240212.pdf.
51Caron and Repetti, supra note 5, at 1274-1280; Repetti, supra
note 40, at 828-850.
52Id.
53See Thomas Piketty and Emmanuel Saez, ‘‘How Progres-
sive is the U.S. Federal Tax System? A Historical and Interna-
tional Perspective,’’ 21 J. Econ. Perspectives 3, 21 (2007); Paul R.
McDaniel et al., Federal Wealth Transfer Taxation 7-14 (2009); and
Boris Bittker and Lawrence Lokken, Federal Taxation of Income,
Estates, and Gifts, para. 120.1.1 (2013).
54Piketty and Saez, supra note 53, at 7.
55Id. at 12-13.
56Id. For examinations of other harms that may arise from
wealth transfer taxes, see, e.g., Charles Davenport and Jay A.
Soled, ‘‘Enlivening the Death-Tax Death-Talk,’’ Tax Notes, July
26, 1999, p. 591; Repetti, ‘‘The Case for the Estate and Gift Tax,’’
Tax Notes, Mar. 13, 2000, p. 1493, 1500-1501; Richard Schmalbeck,
‘‘Avoiding Federal Wealth Transfer Taxes,’’ Rethinking Estate and
Gift Taxation (2001). All these studies reject the argument that the
cost of complying and administering the estate and gift tax
exceeds the revenues collected.
57See, e.g., Caron and Repetti, supra note 5, at 1285-1288;
Repetti, supra note 40; and Repetti, supra note 56.
58There are three studies that have directly examined the
effect of federal estate taxes on savings. One found no evidence
that the estate tax reduces savings. Seymour Fiekowsky, ‘‘The
Effect on Saving of the United States of Estate and Gift Tax,’’
Federal Estate and Gift Taxes (1966). Two found that the estate tax
is related to a reduction of about 10 percent in reported gross
estates. Wojciech Kopczuk and Joel Slemrod, ‘‘The Impact of the
Estate Tax on the Wealth Accumulation and Avoidance Behavior
of Donors,’’ National Bureau of Economic Research Working
Paper No. 7960 (2000); David Joulfaian, ‘‘The Behavioral Re-
sponse of Wealth Accumulation to Estate Taxation: Time Series
Evidence,’’ 59 Nat’l Tax J. 253, 266 (2006). It is not clear, however,
whether this is attributable to a decrease in savings or is
window dressing to reduce the size of the reported estate. A
fourth study also found a similar reduction in reported estates,
but it combined data for state estate and inheritance taxes with
federal estate tax data. Douglas Holtz-Eakin and Donald
Marples, ‘‘Distortion Costs of Taxing Wealth Accumulation:
Income Versus Estate Taxes,’’ NBER Working Paper No. 8261
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the income tax and the estate tax’s role in decreas-
ing the concentration of wealth, it makes sense to
increase the maximum rate to an amount closer to
the historical rate.
Proposal 4: Restrict the ability of gifts made in
trust to qualify for the gift tax annual exclusion.
The annual exclusion was included in the gift tax as
an administrative measure intended to ‘‘obviate the
necessity of keeping an account of and reporting
numerous small gifts and . . . to fix the amount
sufficiently large to cover in most cases wedding
and Christmas gifts and occasional gifts of rela-
tively small amounts.’’59 The annual exclusion was
$5,000 in 1932-1938, was reduced to $4,000 in 1939-
1942 and to $3,000 in 1943-1981, and was increased
to $10,000 in 1981-1999. Since 1999, the annual
exclusion has been indexed for inflation in $1,000
increments,60 with resulting annual exclusions of
$11,000 (2002-2005), $12,000 (2006-2008), $13,000
(2009-2013), and $14,000 (2014-?).
The original conception of the annual exclusion
to keep wedding, Christmas, and other relatively
small gifts out of the gift tax regime was imple-
mented in section 2503(b)(1)’s restriction of the
annual exclusion to gifts of present interests and
disqualification of gifts of future interests in trust
because present interests make it easier to value the
transfer and identify the beneficiary. Congress pro-
vided a limited exception for annual exclusion gifts
to a trust for the benefit of a single minor benefi-
ciary under section 2503(c).61 (A mandatory income
interest in other types of trusts also is treated as a
present interest, as are transfers to section 529
college savings plans.)
Interestingly, however, the original enactment of
the annual exclusion may have foretold its later role
as an estate planning colossus. In inflation-adjusted
terms, the $5,000 annual exclusion of 1932 equals
more than $85,000 in today’s dollars — far exceed-
ing the wedding, Christmas, and other relatively
small gift targets of the exclusion, and far exceeding
today’s $14,000 annual exclusion.
Over 45 years ago, the Ninth Circuit sanctioned
the treatment of beneficiary withdrawal rights as
present interests qualifying for the annual exclusion
in Crummey v. Commissioner.62 With the courts’
subsequent blessing of annual exclusion treatment
of withdrawal rights for multiple contingent ben-
eficiaries63 and repeated rejection of attempts by the
IRS to restrict the reach of Crummey powers,64 the
annual exclusion has morphed into a significant
estate depletion strategy for wealthy families.
For example, a married couple with four married
children who each have four children is able to
make $672,000 of annual exclusion gifts through a
Crummey trust, removing $6.72 million from the
couple’s estates over a 10-year period.
That strategy is of course built on a fiction — that
the Crummey beneficiary’s right to withdraw
$14,000 in a given year is a present interest, even
though all the parties expect that the holder will not
exercise that power. In most cases, it is against the
holder’s interest to exercise the power and thereby
turn off the spigot of future contributions for her
benefit. In our years of practice, we never encoun-
tered the exercise of a Crummey power and concur
in Bridget J. Crawford’s observation that ‘‘if one
were to survey 1,000 estate planning lawyers, it is
unlikely that any could report firsthand knowledge
of the exercise of a Crummey power.’’65
Congress, however, has restricted the utility of
Crummey trusts for GSTT purposes. The GSTT an-
nual exclusion is available only for single-
beneficiary Crummey trusts.66 This gift tax/GSTT
disparity of treatment thus adds complexity to
multigenerational estate planning.
We believe the time has come to return section
2503(b) to its original purpose of excluding only
wedding, Christmas, and other relatively small gifts
from the gift tax. The cleanest way to do this is to
deny the annual exclusion to all gifts in trust other
than a section 2503(c) trust for a single minor
beneficiary (and mandatory income interests in
other trusts).67 Alternatively, the annual exclusion
could be extended to section 2642(c) single-
beneficiary Crummey trusts as well.68
(Apr. 2001). Given the ease with which state estate taxes may be
avoided, we do not believe that this study helps determine the
effect of the federal estate tax.
59H.R. Rep. No. 72-708, at 29 (1932).
60Section 2503(b)(2).
61The trust must (1) permit the trust income and property to
be expended by or for the benefit of the minor before the age of
21; (2) pass to the minor upon his attaining the age of 21; and (3)
pass to the minor’s estate (or under the minor’s general power
of appointment) if the minor dies before the age of 21.
62397 F.2d 82 (9th Cir. 1968).
63Estate of Cristofani v. Commissioner, 97 T.C. 74 (1991).
64See, e.g., Estate of Holland v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo.
1997-302; and Estate of Kohlsaat v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo.
1997-212.
65Bridget J. Crawford, ‘‘Reform the Gift Tax Annual Exclu-
sion to Raise Revenue,’’ Tax Notes, July 25, 2011, p. 443-444.
66Section 2642(c).
67See ABA, supra note 31, at 32-33; Crawford, supra note 65, at
446.
68See also William C. Brown, ‘‘Judicial Expansion of the
Future Interest Exception to the Gift Tax Annual Exclusion:
Examination of the Legislative History and Policy Basis for the
Future Interest Exception,’’ 65 Tax Law. 477 (2012); Bradley E.S.
Fogel, ‘‘Back to the Future Interest: The Origin and Questionable
Legal Basis of the Use of Crummey Withdrawal Powers to Obtain
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Proposal 5: Restrict GRATs through a lifetime
cap. In a GRAT, an individual transfers assets to an
irrevocable grantor trust in return for an annuity
valued in accordance with the section 7520 actuarial
and interest rate tables. The grantor typically zeroes
out the GRAT by ensuring that the present value of
the annuity equals the amount transferred into the
trust, thus eliminating any gift tax on the transfer (a
technique approved by the Tax Court in 2000 for a
zeroed-out GRAT created by Audrey Walton, the
wife of the brother of Wal-Mart founder Sam Wal-
ton).69 In this situation, grantors are banking on the
assets contributed to the trust appreciating at a rate
in excess of the rate of return assumed in the section
7520 tables — an increasingly likely prospect given
the historically low interest rates of recent years. If
the assets in the GRAT perform better than antici-
pated in the section 7520 tables, that extra value
passes tax free to the next generation. If the assets
underperform, the grantor loses nothing (other than
the use of the capital during the term of the trust
and any professional fees incurred). To mitigate the
risk of the grantor dying during the term of the
trust, which would result in the fair market value of
the trust at the date of the grantor’s death being
included in the grantor’s estate under section
2036,70 grantors typically use very short (two-year)
trust terms.
In 2013 press reports documented that the surge
in the use of GRATs among the very wealthy has
achieved eye-popping reductions in estate and gift
taxes — by one estimate, $100 billion since 2000, or
one-third of the total estate and gift taxes collected
over this period.71 Press reports based on SEC
filings detail the extensive use of GRATs by the very
wealthy: Sheldon Adelson (Las Vegas Sands) used
25 GRATs to give $7.9 billion to his heirs and avoid
$2.8 billion in gift taxes; Charles Ergen (Dish Net-
work) and Ralph Lauren funded more than $300
million in GRATs; and Lloyd Blankfein (Goldman
Sachs) funded more than $50 million in GRATs.72
For several years, Obama has proposed limiting
the use of GRATs to shelter assets from the estate
and gift taxes by requiring them to have a minimum
term of 10 years; a maximum term of the life
expectancy of the grantor (plus 10 years); an initial
remainder interest value of greater than zero; and
annuity payments that decline during the term of
the trust.73 These changes are projected to increase
revenues by $3.9 billion in the 2014-2023 period.74
We propose a more robust reform than the presi-
dent’s to more effectively curb this abuse. The staff
of the Joint Committee on Taxation75 and commen-
tators76 point out that the president’s proposed
minimum 10-year GRAT term would do nothing to
stem the growing use of GRATs by younger billion-
aires, like Facebook’s Dustin Moskovitz, Sheryl
Sandberg, and Mark Zuckerberg.77 A different ap-
proach would be to tax the creation of a GRAT as a
gift of an option akin to a stock appreciation right,
so that a taxable gift would be deemed to occur on
its creation. We believe a more fundamental ap-
proach would be to refuse to treat the creation of a
GRAT as a completed gift and instead adopt a
wait-and-see approach and impose the gift tax on
the value of the property that passes to the remain-
dermen. We plan to explore this issue in a subse-
quent article. In the meantime, as a simpler, stop-
gap measure, we suggest imposing a lifetime cap on
the amount that can be transferred to a GRAT.
Although the precise amount of that cap is open to
debate, we suggest an amount tied to the exemption
amount of the unified credit — currently $5.34
million.78
the Federal Gift Tax Annual Exclusion,’’ 6 Fla. Tax Rev. 189
(2003); Fogel, ‘‘The Emperor Does Not Need Clothes: The
Expanding Use of ‘Naked’ Crummey Withdrawal Powers to
Obtain Federal Gift Tax Annual Exclusions,’’ 73 Tul. L. Rev. 555
(1998); Patrick T. Neil, ‘‘‘Bare’ly Legal: The Evolution of Naked
Crummey Powers and a Call for Reform,’’ 30 Fla. St. U. L. Rev.
923 (2003); and John G. Steinkamp, ‘‘Common Sense and the
Gift Tax Annual Exclusion,’’ 72 Neb. L. Rev. 106 (1993).
69Walton v. Commissioner, 115 T.C. 589 (2000).
70But see Michael D. Whitty, ‘‘GRAT Expectations: Question-
ing, Challenging, and Litigating the Service Position on Estate
Tax Inclusion of Grantor Retained Annuity Trusts,’’ 36 ACTEC J.
87 (2010) (arguing that the IRS overstates the amount includable
in the estate of a grantor who dies during the term of the GRAT).
71Zachary R. Mider, ‘‘Accidental Tax Break Saves Wealthiest
Americans $100 Billion,’’ Bloomberg, Dec. 17, 2013.
72Id. See also Mider, ‘‘How Wal-Mart’s Waltons Maintain
Their Billionaire Fortune,’’ Bloomberg, Sept. 12, 2013.
73See green book, supra note 30, at 142; Treasury, ‘‘General
Explanations of the Administration’s Fiscal Year 2013 Revenue
Proposals,’’ at 80 (Feb. 2012); Joint Committee on Taxation,
‘‘Description of Revenue Provisions Contained in the Presi-
dent’s Fiscal Year 2013 Budget Proposal,’’ JCS-2-12, at 269-273
(June 2012) (blue book); Treasury, ‘‘General Explanations of the
Administration’s Fiscal Year 2012 Revenue Proposals,’’ at 128
(Feb. 2011); and JCT, ‘‘Description of Revenue Provisions Con-
tained in the President’s Fiscal Year 2012 Budget Proposal,’’
JCS-3-11, at 516-520 (June 2011).
74See green book, supra note 30, at 244.
75Blue book, supra note 73, at 272.
76Samuel R. Scarcello, ‘‘Transfer Taxes in Flux: A Comparison
of Alternative Plans for GRAT Reform,’’ 107 Nw. U. L. Rev. 321,
348-352 (2012).
77Deborah L. Jacobs, ‘‘Zuckerberg, Moskovitz Give Big Bucks
to Unborn Kids,’’ Forbes, Mar. 3, 2012.
78See also Scarcello, supra note 76, at 352-359.
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Conclusion
In the years after the publication of Cooper’s
article in 1977, Congress plugged many of the estate
and gift tax loopholes that were exploited by
wealthy taxpayers of that generation. In recent
years, Congress has not attended to new avenues of
estate and gift tax avoidance. Like Jack Nicholson
returning home to his dying father in Five Easy
Pieces, if Cooper returned home to the estate and
gift taxes of 2014, he would find them in need of
major surgery to ensure their survival. These ‘‘five
easy pieces’’ of estate and gift tax reform are offered
here as initial steps to restore the estate and gift
taxes to health.
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competition among countries for investment capital
to fuel economic growth. Even among the highly
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services, creation of jobs, and technological innova-
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